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THREE KEY ELEMENTS OF POST-2012
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE
Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins
*
1.  INTRODUCTION
The nations of the world continue to strive to negotiate what may become the post-2012 (or
post-Kyoto) climate regime.  This has happened primarily through the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), but in addition, the key emitting countries of the world
have held a series of meetings under the auspices of the Major Economies Forum for Energy and
Climate and the G20, and a number of nations have met in various bilateral venues.  In each of these
processes, the goal has been to foster international cooperation to address climate change when the
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012.
The Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1997), which came into force in February 2005 and
began to bind for ratified countries in 2008, represents the first significant multinational attempt to
curb the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are changing the global climate.  The Protocol has
both strengths and weaknesses that can provide lessons for the design of future international climate
policy architecture.  The design of such future international policy architecture is the focus of this
symposium of four articles.
In this first article, we describe a promising post-2012 international global climate policy
architecture with three essential elements:  a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing
nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path
of targets; and inclusion of  flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and address
concerns about international equity.
In the second article, Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel (2010) provide an empirical
examination of a related architecture which employs negotiated formulas to generate emissions
targets for all countries through the end of the 21
st century.  Their approach — which builds upon
political realities and constraints — is designed to limit global carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations
to 460 parts per million (ppm).  
Next, Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach (2010) recognize that the defacto post-2012
international climate policy architecture may quite possibly rely upon the bottom-up linkage of a
diverse set of domestic climate policies.  These authors analyze the promise, the mechanics, and the4
challenges of linking such heterogeneous policies, which might include national or regional
cap–and-trade systems, carbon taxes, and some types of regulatory mechanisms.
Finally, Jing Cao (2010) presents the perspective of China, the most important of the
emerging economies, by examining an approach which seeks to reconcile fairness, economic
development imperatives, and sensible climate policy actions.  She takes as her starting point the
Copenhagen Accord, the major substantive outcome of the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties
(COP-15) of the UNFCCC, in Copenhagen, in December 2009.  Cao seeks to identify an
international climate policy architecture which has at its heart a burden-sharing rule that countries
might consider fair, a flexible structure for countries to choose their own domestic policy
approaches, and an overall approach that is politically realistic.
1.1  Looking Back:  The Kyoto Protocol’s Strengths and Weaknesses
Among the Kyoto Protocol’s strengths is its inclusion of provisions for market-based
approaches intended to lower the cost of the global climate regime:  emissions trading among Annex
I countries that take on targets under the Protocol; “joint implementation” which allows for
project-level trades among the Annex I countries; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
which provides for the use of project-level emission offsets created in non-Annex I (developing)
countries to help meet the compliance obligations of firms in Annex I countries. (Annex I of the
UNFCCC and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are often used interchangeably to represent the
industrialized countries that have national emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol.)
Also, the Kyoto Protocol provides flexibility for nations to meet their national emissions
targets — their commitments — in any way they want.  By recognizing domestic sovereignty, it
provides  flexibility at the national level.  Further, the Protocol has at least the appearance of fairness
in that it focuses on the wealthiest countries and those responsible for the majority of the current
stock of anthropogenic GHGs in the atmosphere.  This is consistent with the principle enunciated
in the UNFCCC of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”  Finally,
the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was signed by more than 180 countries and subsequently ratified
by a sufficient number of Annex I countries for it to come into force speaks to the political viability
of the agreement in terms of participation, if not compliance.
The Kyoto Protocol also has some weaknesses.  First, some of the world’s leading emitters
are not constrained.  The United States — until recently the country with the largest share of global
emissions, about 19 percent (Gregg et al. 2008) — has not ratified and is unlikely to ratify the
agreement.  Also, some of the largest, most rapidly growing economies in the world do not take on
targets, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea, and Mexico.  The
developing world will soon overtake the industrialized world in total emissions.  Indeed, China’s
CO2 emissions have surpassed those of the United States (Gregg et al. 2008); and China’s emissions
are expected to continue to grow much faster than U.S. emissions (Blanford, et al. 2008).
Even if all of the Annex I countries, including the United States, were to reduce their CO2
emissions to zero by 2030, it would be physically impossible for the world to achieve the frequently5
discussed climate target of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at or below 450 parts per
million (ppm) without significant reductions by China and India.  The Kyoto Protocol may not be
as fair as originally intended, given how dramatically the world has changed since the UNFCCC
divided countries into two categories in 1992.  Approximately fifty non-Annex I countries now have
higher per capita income than the poorest of the Annex I countries.
A second weakness of the Protocol is the relatively small number of countries which have
agreed to take action.  This “narrow but deep” approach will drive up the costs of producing
carbon-intensive goods and services within the coalition of countries taking action.  Through the
forces of international trade, this approach leads to greater comparative advantage in the production
of carbon-intensive goods and services for countries that do not have binding emissions targets,
thereby shifting production and emissions from participating nations to non-participating nations
— a phenomenon known as “emissions leakage.”  Leakage will reduce the cost-effectiveness and
environmental performance of the agreement, and worse yet, push developing countries onto more
carbon-intensive growth paths than they would otherwise have taken, rendering it more difficult for
these countries to join the coalition of action later.
A third concern centers on the nature of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading elements.
The provision in Article 17 for international emissions trading  is unlikely to be effective, because
the trading would need to be among national governments, not private-sector firms.  The cost-
effectiveness of cap-and-trade systems depends upon the participants being cost-minimizing entities.
This is a reasonable assumption for private firms, because if such firms do not seek to minimize their
costs, and indeed succeed in minimizing their costs, they will tend to disappear, given the
competitive forces of the market.  But nation-states are not simple cost-minimizers — many other
objectives affect their decision-making.  Furthermore, even if nation-states sought to minimize costs,
they do not have sufficient information about marginal abatement costs of the multitude of sources
within their borders to carry out cost-effective trades with other countries (Hahn and Stavins 1999).
Also, there is great concern regarding the CDM, an emissions-reduction-credit system.
When an individual project results in emissions below what they would have been in the absence
of the project, a credit — which may be sold to a source within a cap-and-trade system — is
generated.  This approach creates a challenge: comparing actual emissions with what they would
have been otherwise.  The baseline — what would have happened had the project not been
implemented — is fundamentally unobservable. In fact, there is a natural tendency, because of
economic incentives, to claim credits precisely for those projects that are most profitable, and hence
would have been most likely to have been executed without selling credits.  This is the
“additionality” problem.
Fourth, the Kyoto Protocol, with its five-year time horizon (2008 to 2012), represents a
relatively short-term approach for what is fundamentally a long-term problem.  GHGs reside in the
atmosphere for decades to centuries.  And to encourage the magnitude of technological change that
will be required to meaningfully address the threat of climate change, it will be necessary to send
long-term price signals to the private market to stimulate sustained investment and technological
innovation (Newell 2008).1For a summary of critiques of the Kyoto Protocol and some alternatives, see Aldy, Barrett and Stavins (2003).  A
survey of proposals is provided by Bodansky (2004); and a recent analysis of alternatives is found in Aldy and Stavins
2010.
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Finally, the Kyoto Protocol provides insufficient incentives for compliance (Barrett 2008).
The Protocol’s enforcement mechanism — a requirement that countries make up any deficit in
subsequent compliance periods — is unlikely to induce policy responses consistent with targets.
1.2  Looking Forward
Since the time the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, scientific consensus regarding the
likelihood of future climate change due to anthropogenic emissions of GHGs has grown (Watson
2001, Pachauri 2008), and economic analysis increasingly points to the wisdom of policy action
(Shogren and Toman 2000; Kolstad and Toman 2001; Nordhaus 2008a, 2008b).  However, the
Kyoto Protocol’s ambitious targets apply only to the short term and only to some industrialized
nations.  As a result, the agreement imposes relatively high costs and generates minor short-term
benefits, while failing to provide a real solution.   Some analysts therefore see the agreement as
“deeply flawed” (Victor 2001; Cooper 2001; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, 2004), but others see
it as an acceptable or good first step (Grubb 2003; Michaelowa 2003).  Virtually everyone agrees,
however, that the current framework is not sufficient to the overall challenge and that further steps
will be required.
1  
The negotiation of a post-2012 global climate policy architecture provides an opportunity
to consider a significant dilemma.  The Kyoto Protocol came into force without U.S. participation
or meaningful participation by developing countries; its effects on climate change will be trivial; but
the economic and scientific consensus points to the need for a credible international approach.
Given the global commons nature of the climate problem, a multinational—if not fully
global—approach is required. As long as global marginal benefits exceed every nation’s own
marginal benefits, countries will either want to avoid participating or avoid complying fully if they
do participate. Successful international cooperation must change these incentives (Barrett and
Stavins 2003).
2.  THREE KEY ELEMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE
A post-2012 international global climate policy architecture will need to contain three key
elements:  a means to ensure that the most important industrialized and developing nations are
involved in meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of action; and inclusion of the
flexibility offered by market-based policy instruments.2Taking into account land-use change (particularly deforestation), the responsibility for the atmospheric stock of
anthropogenic carbon dioxide is more evenly distributed among developed and developing countries (Weisbach 2010).
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2.1  Expanding Participation
The vast majority of the accumulated stock of anthropogenic CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere
was emitted by sources in industrialized countries.
2  Therefore, equity concerns may suggest that
industrialized countries should take serious actions to reduce their emissions before developing
countries are asked to make their own contributions to such efforts.  It has therefore been argued that
distributional equity favors a narrow coalition of action, like that embodied in Annex I.  Efficiency,
or more accurately, cost-effectiveness, favors a broader coalition of action, because these criteria
focus on the margin, that is, are forward-looking.  Indeed, we argue that broad participation — by
major industrialized nations and key developing countries — is essential to address this global
commons problem effectively.
2.1.1  Four Reasons for Employing a Broad Set of Participants
The share of global emissions attributable to developing countries is growing rapidly.  China
surpassed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of CO2 in 2006.  The rate of growth in
China’s emissions is even more important:  China emitted 8 percent of global anthropogenic CO2
in 1981, and about 21 percent by 2008 (Gregg et al. 2008; Guan et al. 2009).  More broadly,
developing countries are likely to account for more than half of global emissions by the year 2020,
if not before (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000; Pies and Schröder 2002; U.S. Energy Information
Administration 2009).
In addition to being an important and growing source of emissions, developing countries
provide the greatest opportunities for low-cost emissions reductions (Watson 2001).  Therefore,
inclusion of key developing countries in a climate regime can reduce overall costs dramatically.
According to one estimate, if the major developing countries were to participate in achieving the
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions targets, total costs could be cut by 50 percent (Edmonds et al. 1997).
Another reason to include key developing countries in any post-2012 international climate
policy architecture is that the United States has signaled its unwillingness otherwise to commit to
significant emissions cuts.  In the months leading up to Kyoto, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 in support
of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which stated that the United States Senate would not approve any
agreement that did not include major developing countries under binding targets.  Other
industrialized countries may be willing to agree to more stringent cuts if the United States, China,
and other parties are part of the post-2012 architecture.  The EU indicated in the run-up to COP-15
in Copenhagen, in December, 2009, that it would increase the stringency of its reduction target from
20 percent to 30 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 if other countries would make commitments to
large reductions.
A final reason to include developing countries in a post-2012 global climate policy
architecture is to ensure the environmental effectiveness of emissions reductions by participating8
countries.  If developing countries are not included in an agreement, comparative advantage in the
production of carbon-intensive goods and services may shift outside the coalition of participating
countries, making developing countries’ economies more carbon intensive than they otherwise
would be, through emissions leakage.  Estimates from computable general equilibrium models of
potential carbon leakage rates under a global climate regime range from 5 percent to 34 percent
(Paltsev 2001).
2.1.2  Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Equity
If a post-2012 international climate policy architecture is to be meaningful, the large and
rapidly-growing developing countries must be involved, due to the magnitude of their current
emissions, their expected rates of growth in emissions, their lower costs of emissions reductions, the
increased likelihood of U.S. participation and willingness by other industrialized countries to engage
in deeper emissions reductions, and the possibility of carbon leakage.  However, it is probably
unreasonable to expect developing nations to incur significant emissions-reduction costs in the short
term, because of consequences for their economic development.  Furthermore, it can be argued on
an ethical basis that industrialized countries should take the first emission-reduction steps on their
own, since they are responsible for the bulk of anthropogenic-based concentrations of GHGs in the
atmosphere. 
This poses a policy conundrum.  On the one hand, for purposes of environmental
performance and cost effectiveness, key developing countries must participate in an international
effort to reduce GHG emissions, but on the other hand, for purposes of distributional equity and
international political pragmatism, they cannot be expected to incur the brunt of the consequent
costs.  These countries must get on the “global climate policy train” without necessarily paying full
fare.  How can this be accomplished?
Achieving developing country participation may require a trigger mechanism, imposing
binding commitments only when per capita income, emissions per capita, or some other measure of
development has reached a predetermined level.  But there is no reason to limit action to such a
simple, dichotomous instrument.  A preferable approach would be continuous “growth targets” that
become more stringent for individual counties as they become more wealthy (Lutter 2000).  A
growth target is not a number, but essentially an equation or set of equations that relate targeted
emissions to per-capita income and other variables.  Two necessary characteristics of a growth target
formulation are that it not create perverse incentives that would encourage nations to increase their
emissions and that it should be relatively simple, so as not to create impediments to negotiation
(Aldy, Baron, and Tubiana 2003).
This is a natural extension of the progressive target allocation present in the Kyoto Protocol
from the industrialized world to the developing world and from the cross-sectional dimension to the
temporal dimension.  The Kyoto Protocol’s targets exhibit positive correlation between gross
domestic product per capita and the degree of targeted emissions reduction below business-as-ususal
(BAU) levels.  In fact, according to Frankel (1999, 2005), the Kyoto targets exhibit an “income9
elasticity of reductions” of about 0.14, that is, for a 10 percent increase in per-capita GDP, a
country’s emissions reduction targets — on average — are about 1.4 percent more stringent.
2.1.3  A Formulaic Approach to Allocating Responsibility
In this symposium, Bosetti and Frankel (2010) propose a formulaic approach to generating
emissions targets for all key countries for each five-year period remaining in this century.  Their
formula contains three elements:  progressivity, latecomer catch-up, and gradual movement toward
equal per capita emissions, while constraining targets so as not to impose costs over the century
exceeding an average of 1 percent of GDP per year, or 5 percent of GDP for any country in any
period (Frankel 2008; Bosetti and Frankel 2010).  Game-theoretic analyses suggest that the use of
such formulas can render negotiations more likely to succeed (Harstad 2008).
Their progressivity factor would adjust emissions targets based upon per capita income
(applying the income elasticity of reductions implied by the Kyoto targets).  “Latecomer catch-up”
avoids rewarding countries that failed to curb their emissions after 1990, the Kyoto baseline year.
This would include countries such as Canada, which ratified the Protocol but are unlikely to comply;
countries such as the United States, which did not ratify the agreement; and countries such as China,
which did not take on targets at Kyoto.  This would help close the gap between 1990 emissions and
the starting points of latecomers to the process.  Finally, the “equalization factor” would move all
countries in the direction of global average per capita emissions in the second half of the century,
asking rich countries to make up, somewhat, for the fact that they previously enjoyed the benefits
of unfettered CO2 emissions, creating an environmental problem for which poor countries bear
disproportionate impacts (Frankel 2008).
In the short term, such indexed targets for major developing countries could be set at BAU
emissions levels, but they would become more stringent over time as the countries became
wealthier.  Whereas the emissions targets of China and the other major emerging economies in the
Bosetti and Frankel proposal would be equivalent to BAU emissions from 2010 until 2025, then
dropping below BAU, the poorest countries would have targets equal to BAU for the remainder of
the century.  Keeping even poor countries at or near BAU emissions is an important goal, since it
prevents the possibility of significant carbon leakage.
If provision is not made for such a mechanism that includes developing countries at low or
no cost to them, then the inevitable result will be a trade-off between cost-effectiveness (or
efficiency) and distributional equity (Sugiyama and Deshun 2004).  However, if emissions targets
at BAU for the short- to medium-run (or even the long run for some regions) were combined with
an appropriate international trading program (discussed below), this could — in principle — provide
a direct economic incentive (subsidy) for developing-country participation.  Developing countries
could fully participate without incurring prohibitive costs (or even any costs in the short term).  That
is, cost-effectiveness and distributional equity could both be addressed.10
2.2  An Extended Time Path of Targets
Global climate change is a long-term problem, due to the fact that the relevant GHGs remain
in the atmosphere for decades to centuries, combined with the reality that significant technological
change will be required to bring down costs to levels where greater actions can be taken.  The Kyoto
Protocol fails to reflect these fundamentally important realities with its short-term targets, an average
5 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the 2008–2012 “first commitment period.”  However, this
apparently modest reduction translates into a severe 25–30 percent cut for the United States from
what was its BAU emissions path.  The reason for this is that the United States economy grew at an
exceptionally rapid rate during the 1990s, exhibiting a remarkable 37 percent increase in real GDP
from 1990 to 2000.
This contrasts dramatically with the situation in Europe and elsewhere, where economies
grew more slowly or were even stagnant.  Furthermore, emissions of CO2 from the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Russia fell significantly subsequent to 1990 (the Kyoto Protocol’s baseline year) for
reasons having nothing to do with climate policy.  Emissions fell in the United Kingdom because
of structural changes in the domestic coal industry initiated by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s
government (1979–1990); emissions fell in Germany because reunification led to the closure of
energy-inefficient plants in the former East Germany; and emissions fell in Russia because of its
economic collapse in the 1990s (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002).  It has been estimated that up to
80 percent of the European Union’s CO2 reductions under the Kyoto Protocol would be achieved
by two countries — Germany and the United Kingdom, facilitated via the EU bubble that is part of
the Protocol (Andersen 2002).
More broadly, the Kyoto Protocol’s targets can be characterized as seeking to achieve “too
little, too fast.”  They do little about the problem, but are unreasonable for countries that enjoyed
significant economic growth after 1990.  Two elements can ameliorate this problem:  firm but
moderate targets in the short term to avoid rendering large parts of the capital stock prematurely
obsolete, and flexible but considerably more stringent targets for the long term to motivate (now and
in the future) technological change, which in turn is needed to bring costs down over time (Goulder
and Schneider 1999; Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 1999; Pershing and Tudela 2003; Newell 2008).
Emissions targets ought to start out at BAU levels, and gradually depart from BAU levels, becoming
more stringent over time.  Globally, the aggregate emissions target should not be monotonically
increasing, but should reach a maximum level and then begin to decrease — eventually becoming
substantially more severe than the constraints implied by the Kyoto Protocol’s short-term targets.
Precise, numerical emissions targets for long time horizons, if they are inflexible, are
impractical due to uncertainty over future growth, technological change, and the science of climate
change and its effects. Some of the considerable uncertainty throughout the policy-
economics-biophysical system will be resolved over time (Richels, Manne, and Wigley 2004,
Mendelsohn 2008).  Thus, long-term targets must retain some flexibility.
In addition, since long-run emissions targets would require that current political leaders
(especially elected officials) bind future political leaders to costly commitments, many have pointed11
out that long-term targets are dynamically inconsistent and must incorporate constraints representing
the economic reality that no country is likely to abide by an unenforceable international agreement
that causes great economic disruption in any particular year or set of years (Frankel 2008).
The pattern we suggest is consistent with estimates of the least-cost time path of emissions
for achieving long-term greenhouse-gas concentration targets:  short-term increases in emissions —
just slightly below the BAU path — and subsequent emission reductions (Wigley, Richels, and
Edmonds 1996; Manne and Richels 1997).
Such a time path of long-term targets, put in place now, would be consistent with what is
often denigrated as “politics as usual.”  That is, politicians are frequently condemned for the fact that
in representative democracies there are strong incentives to place costs on future, not current, voters
and, if possible, future generations.  It is typically the politically pragmatic strategy.  In the case of
global climate policy, it can also be the scientifically correct and economically sensible approach.
2.3  Market-Based Policy Instruments
The third essential component of post-Kyoto international policy architecture will be
necessary to achieve global cost-effectiveness and thereby to render the overall architecture
politically achievable:  working through the market rather than against it.  There is widespread
agreement that conventional regulatory approaches cannot do the job, certainly not at acceptable
costs.  To keep costs down in the short term and bring them down even lower in the long term
through technological change, it is essential to embrace market-based instruments (that is, carbon
pricing) as the chief means of reducing GHG emissions (Stavins 1997; Lackner 2005; Metcalf
2009).
On a domestic level in some countries, systems of tradable permits — now known as “cap-
and-trade” — might be used to achieve national targets.  In a cap-and-trade system, sources that
have low costs of control have an incentive to take on added reductions, so that they can sell their
excess permits to sources that face relatively high control costs and would hence wish to reduce their
control efforts (Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whitehead 1997).  This is the same mechanism that was
used in the United States to eliminate leaded gasoline from the market in the 1980s at a savings of
more than $250 million per year (Stavins 2003), and the same mechanism being used to cut sulfur
dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants in the United States by 50 percent, at a savings estimated
to be $1 billion per year (Schmalensee, et al. 1998; Stavins 1998; Ellerman, et al. 2000).  The better
model for climate change policy is the upstream lead-rights system (analogous to trading based on
the carbon content of fossil fuels), rather than the downstream SO2 emissions-trading system.
For some countries, systems of domestic carbon taxes may be more attractive than cap-and-
trade approaches.  Rather than imposing a cap on the quantity of pollution, and allowing regulated
firms to trade allowances to establish a market price for pollution, a tax imposes a specific price on
pollution and allows firms to decide how much to emit in response.  A tax has an effect on firms’
decisions that is essentially identical to the effect of the permit price created by a cap-and-trade
policy; polluters decide, for each ton of emissions, whether to abate that ton (incurring the resulting3Others have argued in favor of an international tax regime.  See, for example:  Cooper (1998, 2008); McKibbin and
Wilcoxen (2002); Pizer (2002); Newell and Pizer (2003); and Nordhaus (2008a).
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abatement costs) or pay the tax and continue to emit that ton.  Domestic carbon taxes — typically
in the form of upstream taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels — have frequently been
recommended by academic economists (Metcalf 2007; Metcalf and Weisbach 2009),
3 but have
received considerably less support in the policy community.
Another promising market-based approach is a hybrid of tax and tradable-permit systems —
that is, an ordinary cap-and-trade system, plus a government promise to sell additional permits at
a stated price (Roberts and Spence 1976; Kopp, et al. 2000; Pizer 2002; McKibbin and Wilcoxen
2002).  This creates a price (and thereby cost) ceiling, and has hence been labeled a safety-valve
system.  Likewise, a price floor can be created by a government promise to purchase allowances
from the market at a given price.  The combination of the two approaches — known as a “price
collar” — can have particular attraction (Murray, Newell, and Pizer 2009).
Among these alternative market-based policy instruments, the one which seems to be
emerging as the preferred approach among industrialized countries is cap-and-trade  (Jaffe and
Stavins 2010).  At the same time, the emission-reduction credit system created under the Kyoto
Protocol — the Clean Development Mechanism — enjoys a solid constituency of support in the
developing world (Somanathan 2008).
2.3.1 The Promise and Problems of International Emissions Trading
The Kyoto Protocol includes in Article 17 a system whereby the parties to the agreement can
engage in trading their “assigned amounts,” that is, their reduction targets, translated into
quantitative terms of emissions (United Nations 1997).  In theory, such a system of international
tradable permits — if implemented only for the industrialized countries (as under the Kyoto
Protocol) — could reduce costs by 50 percent.  If such a system also included major developing
countries, costs could be lowered to 25 percent of what they otherwise would be (Edmonds et al.
1997).
An undisputed attraction — in theory — of an international trading approach is that the
equilibrium allocation of permits, the market-determined permit price, and the aggregate costs of
abatement are independent of the initial allocation of permits among countries.  Emerging empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis for some domestic trading systems (Fowlie and Perloff 2008).
However, permit allocations and aggregate abatement costs will only be independent as long as
particularly perverse types of transaction costs are not prevalent (Stavins 1995), individual
parties—be they nations or firms—do not have market power (Hahn 1984), and other conditions
hold (Hahn and Stavins 2010).  The market-power concern is a real one in the climate change
context.  In any event, the initial allocation can be highly significant in distributional terms, implying
possibly massive international wealth transfers.  Some analysts have highlighted this as a major
objection to an international carbon trading regime (Cooper 1998, 2008), but it is essentially because13
of this feature that a permit system can be used to address cost-effectiveness and distributional
equity.
If an international trading system were used, it must be designed to facilitate integration with
domestic policies that nations use to achieve their respective domestic targets.  In the extreme, if all
countries were to use domestic cap-and-trade systems to meet their national targets (that is, allocate
shares from an international permit system to private domestic parties), then an international system
can — in theory — be cost-effective, because a nation-nation trading system then evolves essentially
into an international firm-firm trading system.  On the other hand, if some countries were to use non-
trading approaches, such as GHG taxes or various kinds of regulatory standards — which seems
likely — cost minimization is less ensured (Hahn and Stavins 1999; Metcalf and Weisbach 2010).
Thus, individual nations’ choices of domestic policy instruments to meet their targets can
substantially limit the cost-saving potential of an international trading program.  A trade-off exists
between degree of domestic sovereignty and degree of cost-effectiveness.  A possible answer, which
we discuss below, is the linkage of independent domestic and regional cap-and-trade systems, and
for that matter, domestic carbon taxes and some types of national regulatory systems, thereby
facilitating some degree of cost-effective trades among individual sources (firms), both domestically
and internationally.
2.3.2 Is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme a Useful Model?
When the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, few would have predicted that European
countries would employ cap-and-trade systems, given the European Union’s strenuous opposition
to such approaches.  But after some initial flirtations with carbon tax considerations, the EU
launched a continent-wide trading system for CO2 to meet its emissions reduction targets under the
Protocol (Kruger and Pizer 2004).
The Kyoto Protocol establishes a bubble for the European Union, that is, it sets a cap on CO2
emissions for the EU as a whole, allocated by the EU to its member states.  Under this cap, the
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was established in 2005, and after a pilot
phase, entered its more meaningful Kyoto phase in January 2008. 
The EU ETS is the world's largest emissions trading system, covering some 12,000 facilities
in 27 countries as of 2008, and accounting for nearly one-half of EU CO2 emissions (Ellerman and
Buchner 2007, Ellerman and Joskow 2008, Ellerman 2008, Convery and Redmond 2007).   The pilot
phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007) was designed to set up the institutional and operating structures
necessary for trading.  The cap in the EU system in this pilot phase was a very small reduction below
expected emissions in the absence of the policy.  Given that the system was designed not to begin
to bind in meaningful ways until 2008, which turned out to be a time of global recession (and hence
falling CO2 emissions), it is much too soon to determine the impact of this new carbon market on
emissions, or the cost savings from the EU ETS over more prescriptive approaches.14
The EU ETS could conceivably serve as a prototype for a post-2012 international global
climate regime, since the 30 states involved constitute an increasingly diverse set of sovereign
countries.  Many of the problems encountered and addressed by the EU ETS may be similar to those
a fully international architecture would encounter.  Indeed, the EU ETS has not been without its
conflicts.  Nine of the ten East European countries have sued the European Commission over their
allotted emissions caps for 2008-2012.  But the“club benefits” of continued membership in the
European Union, including free labor and capital flows and access to broader markets, have
apparently outweighed the costs of the EU ETS for these poorer nations, as they have chosen to
remain within the system, rather than dropping out (Ellerman 2008).
2.3.3 The Status of Climate Cap-and-Trade in the United States
Although the U.S. government (Senate) did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, some states have
enacted policies to reduce their GHG emissions.  The largest U.S. market-based initiative is the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade system among 10 northeastern states,
initiated in 2003.  The trading program, which began in earnest in 2009, covers electricity generators
within the region.  Allowances under RGGI are auctioned, and firms trade allowances and various
financial derivatives (including futures and options contracts) in a secondary market.  The RGGI
CO2 emissions cap for 2009-2014  roughly equals the sum of recent emissions among covered
generators, then declines by 2.5 percent per year from 2015 through 2018.
California continues to take serious steps toward establishing its own cap-and-trade system
for CO2 emissions to meet the requirements of its Global Warming Solutions Act 2006 (otherwise
known as Assembly Bill 32, or AB 32), namely achieving emissions in 2020 equal to those of 1990
(Jaffe and Stavins 2010).
In June 2009, the Federal government in the United States began to take its most significant
steps toward putting in place a national cap-and-trade policy to reduce CO2 emissions, with the
passage in the House of Representatives of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, also
known as the Waxman-Markey bill, named for the two Members of Congress who developed the
legislation.  The legislation would cap national GHG emissions by nearly all significant sources,
including coal-fired power plants, factories, natural gas suppliers, and fuels, setting up an economy-
wide cap-and-trade system to achieve emissions reductions.  The target reductions for covered
sources in the bill amount to cuts of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, and progressively steeper
cuts as time goes on (42 percent by 2030, and 83 percent by 2050).  
In May 2010, companion legislation was introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senators John
Kerry and Joseph Lieberman — the American Power Act.  Like the House legislation, this proposal
features a cap-and-trade system.
2.3.4 Linking National and Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems
In addition to the nations of the European Union and the United States, a number of other
major countries in the industrialized world are currently considering the adoption of national cap-15
and-trade systems to reduce their CO2 emissions,  including Australia, Canada, Japan, and New
Zealand (Jaffe and Stavins 2010).  The increasing number of existing, planned, and proposed
regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade policies for CO2 emissions reduction raises the
possibility that the linkage of these systems will be a significant element of future international
climate policy architecture.  In this context, linkage refers to the recognition of the allowances
(permits) from one system for use in meeting compliance requirements of another.  The potential
benefits of such linkage include cost savings from increasing the scope of the market, greater market
liquidity, reduced price volatility, lessened market power, and reduced carbon leakage (Jaffe and
Stavins 2010).
Such linkage of domestic cap-and-trade systems can be initiated by bilateral or multilateral
agreements among respective governments, but it leads to trading not among governments, but
among firms within the respective countries.  This circumvents the problems, mentioned earlier,
which are inherent in international emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (Hahn
and Stavins 1999).
Domestic cap-and-trade programs could be linked directly, either unilaterally or bilaterally.
With a direct bilateral linkage, a pair of domestic cap-and-trade policies would recognize allowances
from the other system.  Under unilateral linkage, one system recognizes allowances from the other,
but the recognition is not mutual.  Allowance prices would converge with direct bilateral linkage,
so long as there were no constraints on inter-system trades, and with unilateral linkage as long as
the buying system’s price was higher than the selling system’s price – no trading would take place
if the opposite were true (Jaffe and Stavins 2010).
A potential problem is that direct linkage of cap-and-trade systems will lead to the automatic
transmission of cost-containment elements — banking, borrowing, safety valves, and price collars
— from one system to the other.  This raises concerns for some countries, because of the possible
loss of control of their domestic systems, and raises the possibility that systems would need to be
harmonized in advance of linkage.
This necessity for prior harmonization can be avoided through the substitution of indirect
links for direct ones.  If each cap-and-trade system links with a common emission-reduction credit
system, then all of the cap-and-trade systems will be linked (indirectly), achieving the benefits of
cost reduction, greater market liquidity, reduced price volatility, lessened market power, and reduced
carbon leakage, but with greatly reduced transmission of cost-containment mechanisms from one
system to another, thereby reducing, if not eliminating the need for prior harmonization.  With a
sufficient supply of credits, prices in all systems will converge, though this may not occur if binding
constraints are imposed on the use of credits and allowances from other systems.
This is a rather good description of what appears to be evolving, that is, the emergence of
regional and national cap-and-trade systems in the industrialized world, each of which allows offsets
to some degree from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the emission-reduction credit
system in developing countries that was established under the Kyoto Protocol.  Under the CDM,
certified emissions reductions (CERs) are awarded for voluntary emission reduction projects in16
developing countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but are not among the countries subject to
emissions limitations.  The industrialized countries that did take on emissions targets under the
Protocol can use CERs to meet their commitments.  The CDM will have generated more than 2.7
billion (tons of) CERs by the end of 2012, the vast majority of them for projects in China, India, and
Brazil (Jaffe and Stavins 2010).  The process of indirect linkage has begun, since CERs can be used
to meet emissions commitments within the EU ETS and RGGI (under certain circumstances). 
A potential concern associated with linking cap-and-trade systems through a common
emission-reduction credit systems is “additionality” – credit systems, including the CDM, have been
plagued by questions about the actual emissions reductions represented by credits, because of the
difficulty of establishing a baseline against which reductions can be measured.  Linking credit
systems with cap-and-trade system passes this worry along to the latter system, in which it would
otherwise not be a significant concern.  Thus, there is a trade-off between the potential economic
and environmental gains of such a bottom-up system of global indirect linkage, and the potential
economic and environmental losses that linkage can bring about if additionality problems are severe.
2.3.5 The Role of Emissions Trading in a Future International Climate Policy Architecture
One of the key objections to the efficacy of a post-2012 international climate policy
architecture with international emissions trading as a core element is that industrialized countries
will not support such a policy, once the cross-border financial flows implied by trading allocations
that favor developing countries (in order to prompt their accession to the agreement) become
apparent (Victor 2007, Cooper 1998).  However, despite the significant variation in per capita
income across EU ETS member states, this has not turned out to be a point of controversy (Ellerman
2008).  This may be due to the fact that, while trading is active, financial flows from emissions
trading represent a very small portion of total imports and exports.  For example, the United
Kingdom is the largest emissions allowance importer in the ETS, importing 14 percent of its verified
emissions, worth about £350 million.  But this still represents a very small portion – less than one-
tenth of one percent – of its total imports of goods and services, about £415 billion (Ellerman 2008).
Furthermore, it is useful to keep in mind that any viable alternative that engages the major
developing countries in an international climate policy architecture will likely involve some form
of financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries.
The experience of the EU ETS, the U.S. preference for trading, and support voiced by other
countries represent important political arguments for this element of a future international climate
policy architecture.  International permit trading — not among countries, per se, but among firms
within and across countries — thus remains a promising approach to achieving global greenhouse
targets, despite the challenges that exist.  It is probably fair to state that the more one studies
international tradable permit systems to address global climate change, the more one comes to
believe that this is the worst possible approach — except, of course, for all the others.17
2.3.6 Incorporating Linkage Among a More Heterogeneous Set of National Policies
Although cap-and-trade systems appear as of now to be the preferred approach in most parts
of the industrialized world for meaningful GHG emission reductions, it also appears likely that some
— perhaps a sizable share of — countries will use other approaches, ranging from other market-
based instruments, in particular, carbon taxes, to more conventional types of regulatory instruments,
such as performance standards and technology standards.  This raises questions about whether
bottom-up linkage among a heterogeneous set of national policies is feasible and at what cost.
The short answer is that although bilateral allowance recognition between cap-and-trade
systems is the simplest and easiest form of linkage, it is also possible to link carbon tax systems with
cap-and-trade systems.  For that matter, some types of regulatory standards can also be linked (Hahn
and Stavins 1999; Metcalf and Weisbach 2010).  Direct linkages — and, more likely, indirect
linkages through a common emission-reduction-credit system — are possible among a fairly broad,
but not unlimited set of national policy instruments.  Problems arise with some types of linkages,
but some of these can be addressed through ex ante harmonization.  Rather than saying more here,
we direct the reader’s attention to the companion paper in this symposium by Metcalf and Weisbach
(2010), which focuses on these very questions.
3.  CONCLUSION
The three elements we have identified are likely to be essential aspects of a future global
climate change policy architecture that is meaningful and feasible, and can serve as a successor to
the Kyoto Protocol.  Key nations have to be involved, including major emerging economies through
the use of economic trigger mechanisms such as growth targets.  In addition, cost-effective time
paths of targets are required:  firm, but moderate in the short term, and in the long term, much more
stringent and flexible.  Finally, to keep costs down, market-based policy instruments need to be part
of the package, whether emissions trading, carbon taxes, or hybrids of the two.  Most likely,
international linkage of regional, national, and even sub-national market-based instruments will be
the means through which this third element is implemented.
This overall approach can be made to be scientifically sound, economically rational, and
perhaps politically pragmatic.  There is no denying that the challenges facing adoption and
successful implementation of this climate policy architecture are significant, but they need not be
insurmountable, and they are no greater than the challenges facing other approaches to the threat of
global climate change.18
REFERENCES
Aldy, Joseph E., Scott Barrett, and Robert N. Stavins. 2003.  “Thirteen Plus One:  A Comparison of Global Climate
Policy Architectures.”  Climate Policy 3(4):373–97.
Aldy, Joseph E. and Robert N. Stavins.  2010.  Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy:  Implementing Architectures
for Agreement.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.
Aldy, Joseph E., R. Baron, and L. Tubiana. 2003. “Addressing Cost: The Political Economy of Climate Change.” In:
Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change, ed. Elliot Diringer. Arlington,
Virginia:  Pew Center on Global Climate Change, pp. 85-110.
Andersen, M. S. 2002. “Regulation or Coordination: European Climate Policy Between Scylla and Charybdis.”  Paper
presented at 10th Symposium of the Egon Sohmen Foundation, “Climate Protection and Emissions Trading
— U.S. and European Views,” Dresden, Germany, October 25-26.
Barrett, Scott. 2008. “A Portfolio System of Climate Treaties.”  Discussion Paper 08-13, Harvard Project on
International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy
School, October.
Barrett, Scott, and Robert N. Stavins. 2003. “Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change
Agreements.”  International Environmental Agreements:  Politics, Law and Economics 3(4): 349–76.
Blanford, Geoffrey J., Richard G. Richels, and Thomas F. Rutherford.  “Revised Emissions Growth Projections for
China:  Why Post-Kyoto Climate Policy Must Look East.” Discussion Paper 08-06, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, September 2008.
Bodansky, Daniel. 2004.  International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012:  A Survey of Approaches.  Arlington, Virginia:
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, December.
Bosetti, Valentina, and Jeffrey Frankel.  2010.  “Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility:  Specific
Formulas and Emissions Targets to Attain 460 ppm CO2 Concentrations.”  Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy (this issue).
Cao, Jing.  2010.  “Beyond Copenhagen:  Reconciling International Fairness, Economic Development, and Climate
Protection.”  Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (this issue).
Convery, Frank J., and Luke Redmond. 2007. “Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 1(1): 88-111. 
Cooper, Richard. 1998. “Toward a Real Treaty on Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 77(2): 66–79.
Cooper, Richard. 2001.  “The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept.” FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2001, July.
Cooper, Richard.  2008.  “The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions.”  Discussion Paper 08-10, Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, October.
Edmonds, J. , S. H. Kim, C. N. McCracken, R. D. Sands, and M. A. Wise. 1997.  Return to 1990: The Cost of
Mitigating United States Carbon Emissions in the Post-2000 Period.  Washington, D.C.:  Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, operated by Battelle Memorial Institute.19
Ellerman, A. Denny. 2008. “The EU Emission Trading Scheme: A Prototype Global System?” Discussion Paper 2008-
02, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, August.
Ellerman, A. Denny, and Barbara K. Buchner. 2007. “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins,
Allocation, and Early Results,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 1(1): 66-87.
 
Ellerman, A. Denny, and Paul L. Joskow. 2008. The European Union's Emissions Trading System in Perspective, Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, D.C.
Ellerman, A. Denny, Paul Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth Bailey. 2000.  Markets
for Clean Air:  The U.S. Acid Rain Program.  New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fowlie, Meredith, and Jeffrey M. Perloff. 2008. “Distributing Pollution Rights in Cap-and-Trade Programs:  Are
Outcomes Independent of Allocation?” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 1999.  “Greenhouse Gas Emissions.”  Policy Brief No. 52.  Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2005. “You’re Getting Warmer: The Most Feasible Path for Addressing Global Climate Change Does
Run Through Kyoto.”  In: Trade and the Environment in the Perspective of the EU Enlargement, ed. M.
Tamborra and J. Maxwell. Cheltenham, United Kingdom:  Edward Elgar, pp. 37-58.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2008. “An elaborated proposal for global climate policy architecture: Specific formulas and emission
targets for all countries in all decades,” Discussion Paper 2008-08, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on
International Climate Agreements, October.
Goulder, Lawrence H., and Stephen H. Schneider. 1999. “Induced Technological Change and the Attractiveness of CO2
Abatement Policies.” Resource and Energy Economics 21(3-4): 211–53.
Gregg, Jay S., Robert J. Andres, and Gregg Marland. 2008. “China: Emissions pattern of the world leader in CO2
emissions from fossil fuel consumption and cement production,” Geophysical Research Letters 35, L08806,
doi:10.1029/2007GL032887.
Grubb, Michael. 2003.  “The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol,” World Economics 4(3): 143–89.
Guan, Dabo, Glen P. Peters, Christopher L. Weber, and Klaus Hubacek. 2009. “Journey to the world top emitter: An
analysis of the driving forces of China’s recent CO2 emissions surge,” Geophysical Research Letters 36,
L04709, doi: 10.1029/2008GL036540.
Hahn, Robert W. 1984.  “Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 99:753-
765.
Hahn, Robert W., and Robert N. Stavins. 1999.  What Has the Kyoto Protocol Wrought?  The Real Architecture of
International Tradable Permit Markets.  Washington, D.C.:  American Enterprise Institute Press.
Hahn, Robert W. and Robert N. Stavins 2010.  “The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System
Performance.”  Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP10-010.  Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Harstad, Bard.  2008.  “How to Negotiate and Update Climate Agreements.”  Discussion Paper 08-19, Harvard Project
on International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy
School, November.20
Hockenstein, Jeremy B., Robert N. Stavins, and Bradley W. Whitehead. 1997.  “Crafting the Next Generation of
Market-Based Environmental Tools.”  Environment, May 1997, 12–20 and 30–33.
Jaffe, Adam B., Richard G. Newell, and Robert N. Stavins. 1999.  “Energy-Efficient Technologies and Climate Change
Policies: Issues and Evidence.” Climate Issue Brief No. 19. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Reprinted in Michael A. Toman, ed. 2001. Climate Change Economics and Policy. Washington, DC:
Resources For the Future, pp. 171–181.
Jaffe, Judson, and Robert N. Stavins. 2010. “Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy
Architecture.”  Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, eds., Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy:
Implementing Architectures for Agreement, pp. 119-150.  Cambridge, United Kingdom:  Cambridge University
Press.
Kopp, Raymond J., Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. Pizer, and Michael A. Toman. 2000.  “A Proposal for Credible
Early Action in US Climate Policy.”  In: Flexible Mechanisms for Efficient Climate Policy: Cost Saving
Policies and Business Opportunities, ed. K. L. Brockmann and M. Stonzik.  Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-
Verlag.
Kolstad, Charles D., and Michael Toman. 2001.  “The Economics of Climate Policy.” Discussion Paper 00-40REV.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Reprinted in Karl-Goran Mäler and Jeffrey Vincent, eds.,
Handbook of Environmental Economics, Volume II.  Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Kruger, J. A. and W. A. Pizer. 2004. “Greenhouse Gas Trading In Europe: The New Grand Policy Experiment.”
Environment, November 2004, pp. 8–23.
Lackner, Klaus.  2005. “Carbon Management Technology.”  Paper presented at “Global Warming:  Looking Beyond
Kyoto,” Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, October 21-22.
Lutter, Randall. 2000. “Developing Countries’ Greenhouse Emissions: Uncertainty and Implications for Participation
in the Kyoto Protocol.”  The Energy Journal 21(4): 93–120.
Manne, Alan and Richard Richels. 1997.  On Stabilizing CO2 Concentrations — Cost-Effective Emission Reduction
Strategies.  Stanford, California:  Stanford University and Electric Power Research Institute, April.
McKibbin, Warrick and Peter Wilcoxen. 2002  “The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 16(2):107–29.
McKibbin, Warrick and Peter Wilcoxen. 2004. “Estimates of the Costs of Kyoto: Marrakesh versus the McKibbin-
Wilcoxen Blueprint.”  Energy Policy 32(4): 467-479.
Mendelsohn, Robert.  2008. “The Policy Implications of Climate Change Impacts.” In: Global Warming: Looking
Beyond Kyoto, ed. Ernesto Zedillo. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University
and Brookings Institution Press, pp. 82-88.
Metcalf, Gilbert.  2007.  A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable Tax Reform to Address Global Climate
Change.  Discussion Paper 2007-12, Hamilton Project, Brookings Institute.
Metcalf, Gilbert.  2009.  “Market-based Policy Options to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions.”  Journal of
Economic Perspectives 23.2 (2009): 5-27.
Metcalf, Gilbert and David Weisbach.  2009.  “The Design of a Carbon Tax.”  Harvard Environmental Law Review
33.2 (2009): 499-506.21
Metcalf, Gilbert and David Weisbach.  2010.  “Linking Policies When Tastes Differ:  Global Climate Policy in a
Heterogeneous World.”  Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (this issue)
Michaelowa, Axel. 2003.  “Global Warming Policy.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3): 204–05.
Michaelowa, A., M. Stronzik, F. Eckermann, and A. Hunt. 2003. “Transaction Costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms.”
Climate Policy 3(3): 261–78.
Murray, Brian, Richard Newell, and William Pizer.  2009.  “Balancing cost and emissions certainty: An allowance
reserve for cap-and-trade.”  Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 3 no. 1 (Winter, 2009), pp.
84-103.
Nakicenovic, N. and R. Swart, eds. 2000.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios.  Cambridge, United Kingdom:  Cambridge University Press.
Newell, Richard G.  2008.  “International Climate Technology Strategies.”  Discussion Paper 08-12, Harvard Project
on International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy
School, October.
Newell, Richard G., and William A. Pizer. 2003.  “Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty.”  Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 45(2, suppl. 1): 416–32.
Nordhaus, William D. 2008a.  “Economic Analyses of Kyoto Protocol: Is There Life After Kyoto?” In: Global
Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto, ed. Ernesto Zedillo. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Globalization,
Yale University and Brookings Institution Press, pp. 91-100.
Nordhaus, William D.  2008b.  A Question of Balance:  Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies.  New
Haven:  Yale University Press.
Pachauri, Rajendra K. 2008.  “The IPCC: Establishing the Evidence.” In: Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto, ed.
Ernesto Zedillo. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University and Brookings
Institution Press, pp. 13-20.
Paltsev, S. V. 2001.  “The Kyoto Protocol: Regional and Sectoral Contributions to the Carbon Leakage.”  The Energy
Journal 22(4): 53–79.
Pershing, J., and F. Tudela. 2003.  “A Long-Term Target: Framing the Climate Effort.” In: Beyond Kyoto:  Advancing
the International Effort Against Climate Change, ed. Eliot Diringer.  Arlington, Virginia:  Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, pp. 11-36.
Pies, I., and G. Schröder. 2002.  Causes and Consequences of Global Warming:  How Rational is Our Policy on
Climate Change?  Munich:  Policy Consult.
Pizer, William A. 2002.  “Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global Climate Change.”  Journal of
Public Economics 85(3): 409–34.
Richels, Richard G.,  Alan S. Manne, and Thomas M. L. Wigley. 2004.  “Moving Beyond Concentrations — The
Challenge of Limiting Temperature Change.” AEI-Brookings Joint Center working paper no. 04-11
Washington, D.C.:  AEI-Brookings Joint Center.
Roberts, Mark, and Michael Spence. 1976.  “Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty.”  Journal of Public
Economics 5(3–4): 193–208.22
Schmalensee, Richard, Paul Joskow, Denny Ellerman, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth Bailey. 1998.  “An Interim
Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(3): 53–68.
Shogren, Jay F., and Michael A. Toman. 2000.  “Climate Change Policy.”  In: Public Policies for Environmental
Protection, Second Edition, ed. Paul R. Portney and Robert N. Stavins. Washington, DC: Resources for the
Future, pp. 125-168.
Somanathan, E.  2008.  “What Do We Expect from an International Climate Agreement? A Perspective from a
Low-income Country.” Discussion Paper 08-27, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, December.
Stavins, Robert N. 1995.  “Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits.”  Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 29(2): 133–48.
Stavins, Robert N. 1997.  “Policy Instruments for Climate Change:  How Can National Governments Address a Global
Problem?”  The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1997, pp. 293-329.
Stavins, Robert N. 1998.  “What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment?  Lessons from SO2 Allowance
Trading.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(3): 69–88.
Stavins, Robert N. 2003.  “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments.” In: Handbook of
Environmental Economics, Volume I, ed. Karl-Goran Mäler and Jeffrey Vincent. Amsterdam:  Elsevier
Science,  pp. 355–435.
Sugiyama, T., and L. Deshun. 2004.  “Must Developing Countries Commit [to] Quantified Targets?  Time Flexibility
and Equity in Climate Change Mitigation.”  Energy Policy 32(5): 697–704.
United Nations. 1992.  “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”  
United Nations. 1997.  “Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on Climate Change.”
U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2009. International Energy Outlook 2009.  Report No. DOE/EIA-0484(2009).
Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, May.
Victor, David G. 2001. The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming.  Princeton, New
Jersey:  Princeton University Press.
Victor, David G. 2007. “Fragmented carbon markets and reluctant nations: Implications for the design of effective
architectures,” In: Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World,
ed. Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-172.
Watson, Robert T., ed. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Contributions of Working Group I, II, and III
to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Weisbach, David. 2010. “Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change,” Working Paper, The
University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL.
Wigley, Thomas, Richard Richels, and Jae Edmonds. 1996.  “Economic and Environmental Choices in the Stabilization
of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations.” Nature 18: 240–43.